- Author
- godoglyness (godoglyness.bsky.social)
- Published
- 14 March 2026
- Kind
- Bluesky reply with a short thread of replies
- Original
- bsky.app/profile/godoglyness.bsky.social/post/3mgy57np3e22c
- Subject
- Saved posts
- Themes
- What counts as a mind
What it is
godoglyness replied to Seb Krier, who praised a paper against computational functionalism. The reply says the paper is good but wrong in one place. Four replies follow, one by the same author.
What it says
- The post says section 2.2 of the paper implies epiphenomenalism and is therefore incorrect.
- The post asks what causal difference experience being a brain state adds to the computation.
- The post says that if there is no difference, the view is epiphenomenal.
- A follow-up says a difference would break the paper's success condition in section 2.1.
- Replier Avel Guenin--Carlut says yes, assuming consciousness is emergent or supervenient, with an aspect-at-scale caveat.
- Replier lathrys.at says the paper assumes unargued things about the metaphysics of concepts.
What evidence it gives
The post offers only argument, as a short question. It quotes one formula from section 2.1. It cites no experiments or other sources.
Interests and limits
The source is a quick social post. The paper was not read, so its claims are known only through this thread. The author's reading of section 2.2 is not checked. Only the Bluesky thread was read, and the paper was not read.