- Author
- Hilarius Bookbinder (Scriptorium Philosophia)
- Published
- 24 October 2025
- Kind
- Substack essay in metaphilosophy
- Original
- hilariusbookbinder.substack.com/p/a-defense-of-philosophical-intuitions
- Subject
- Mind, attention and practice
- Themes
- Taste and judgment, What counts as a mind
What it is
Hilarius Bookbinder writes a philosophy newsletter. The essay answers critics who say intuitions are not good evidence. It sets out to show intuitions are no worse off than the senses.
What it says
- Bookbinder says mental faculties, such as sight and memory, vary by person.
- The essay says these faculties serve as evidence and can all be wrong. Rejecting fallible sources leads to radical skepticism.
- Bookbinder says rational intuition is a quick judgment about a priori claims.
- The essay says an evolutionary debunking argument against intuition would equally undermine perception.
- Bookbinder says cross-cultural variation in intuitions does not matter, since perception also varies across cultures.
- The essay says experimental philosophy relies on perception, so attacking perception undermines its own results.
What evidence it gives
The essay gives argument by analogy. It cites aphantasia, the rubber hand experiment and a patient of Oliver Sacks. It does not report original studies.
Interests and limits
The author is a philosopher defending a field's methods. The essay says it skips the details of replication disputes in experimental philosophy. It answers only a few objections to intuition. The essay was read in full, but only two reader comments were loaded.